benign. But unlike my view of the Uglers, let's finally stipulate, your view is flat out false.

Now there's lots that may be distracting about this little analogy (Lucy would say there's lots that is irritating about it). But my very modest goal has been to clarify the *logical nature* of the dilemma I see between Linus and Charlie. I claim that the *form* of argument, and so the rules that license inferential moves, are in all *essential* respects *the same* for Linus and Charlie. That sameness, it seems to me, also results in identical *formal* criteriologies for knowledge ascription. The idea of a criteriology for ascribing knowledge is fairly important, so let me briefly explain.

[2]
Some Criteriologies for Ascribing Knowledge: The Traditional, the Hokey, & the Strange

(Lucy is scribbling furiously, trying to keep track of my comments as she works on her glossary. She is not a happy camper. "Will this hurt?" she wants to know.

"Of course," I say; "no philosophy worth its salt is painless. But trust me, it will be well worth the effort."

"And something else," she says. "You call this a 'nutshell'? More like a 'pumpkin shell,' I'd say—so either quit writing or switch metaphors!"

"Give me a break!" I say. "No one will be able to properly overhear the pumpkin patch dialogue unless we keep going.")

As far back as Plato, philosophers have attempted to formulate the conditions that are both necessary and collectively sufficient to say of some individual that he or she genuinely *knows* that some proposition or other is true. With the birth of modern science in the 17th century, philosophy became even obsessed with the quest precisely to define knowledge and the exact conditions under which it may be attributed. Scientific knowledge was of course the paradigm—and for the most part, it still is. For our purposes what matters is the brief *formula*, first outlined in Plato's *Theaetetus* some 2400 years ago, and then rather endlessly adjusted in 20th century Anglo-American philosophy. I will provide the formula (or

http://www.ibri.org/Books/DefeasiblePumpkin/README.htm