purely metaphysical analysis. And to anticipate, Van Til's contributions to theory of knowledge will be seen to be of this sort.

Since apologetics is a case of *applied epistemology* a knowledge analysis that supplies no criteria (or one that stipulates unobtainable criteria) for the application of the knowledge concept can likewise supply no criteria for the application of that concept within apologetics. In a word, without criteria, knowledge and ignorance are indistinguishable; to the extent that a theory of knowledge negates criterial links between minds and items of knowledge, it is a bad theory.

To facilitate matters I'll use the standard notation: 'S' stands for some arbitrary human subject, and 'p' stands for some arbitrary proposition. The traditional analysis is:

> S knows that p if, and only if,
>   (1) p is true,
>   (2) S believes that p,
> and
>   (3) S is justified in believing that p.

This analysis says that knowledge is *justified true belief.* For example, consider whether the proposition "humans evolved from one-celled life" should count as knowledge for the philosopher Daniel Dennett. The answer is yes *if,* and *only if:* (1) this proposition is true, (2) it is believed by Dennett, and (3) Dennett is justified in so believing. According to this analysis, that is what it would *mean* to ascribe such knowledge to Dennett. The analysis itself, of course, merely lists the conditions that must be satisfied; it is totally silent as to *whether* these conditions are *in fact* satisfied in any given case. Plug into this little formula your own self (in place of the subject S) and your own favorite proposition (in place of p) and see how well you do.

Keep in mind that the point of identifying the traditional analysis is neither to criticize it nor to defend it. For my part, I do find much that is intuitively right about it (as an analysis of *propositional* knowledge), but fine-tuning condition (3), the justification condition, has given philosophers