

fits for decades. (For a mind-numbing tour through this recent intellectual history, see *The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research* by Robert K. Shope [1983]. To regain your sanity, sit back and relax with Alvin Plantinga's *Warrant and Proper Function*. [1993])

To continue, condition (1)—the truth condition of the traditional analysis—is surely indispensable for any viable analysis of the knowledge concept, for we have the strongest of intuitions that says that if we *know* a given proposition, it has to be true. But truth cannot be discerned as in fact satisfied *independently* of knowledge, and this seems to threaten the analysis with circularity. And then there is the question of bona fide human knowledge that seems to resist propositional characterization altogether—gestaltic apprehension, as it might be called. So to keep this exercise manageable, I propose, and Lucy emphatically seconds the motion, that we tiptoe quietly past the traditional perplexities that attend the traditional analysis. (Toward the very end of "The Defeasible Pumpkin," Linus will say a few words about finitude that I think apply to these perplexities.)

Let's now give the above formula some substance and wonder whether I truly know that the Uglers have colonized the moon. 'H' stands for 'Hoover' and 'u' stands for 'The Uglers are real.' Condition (3), you will note, has been adjusted to reflect the justifying authority of the tea leaf test:

H knows that u if, and only if, (1) u is true, (2) H believes that u, and (3) H's tea leaf reading proves positive that u.

Lucy is rolling her eyes, but I have thick skin on this issue—on the value, that is, of a rational scaffolding that helps me think the issue through. Lucy prides herself in being able to *smell* a rat, even an epistemological rat; but I find that visible props help a lot. At a glance I can tell from *this* analysis that knowledge is *tea leaf certified true belief*. But of course condition (3) is a howler. As an alternative justification condition it's