

simply absurd and will have very few takers. Note, however, that on the assumptions already provided within my fantasy example, I *did* satisfy two of the knowledge conditions in the traditional analysis: by stipulation, 'u' is true, and (also by stipulation) I *do* believe that 'u' is true. But because the justification for my belief is hokey, we would be very reluctant, I should think, to ascribe *knowledge* that 'u' to me. When all three conditions are *necessary* conditions, two out of three is fatal. (And calm down Lucy; I was only *pretending* to believe that the Uglers are real! We're still in illustration mode.)

We will take up the application of this procedure to the apologetic of Linus and Charlie momentarily, but let me first summarize the main points so far. First, the benefit of mocking up even a rough formal analysis offers the convenience of rendering visible and more rigorous what might otherwise remain obscure. There is, moreover, the great benefit of a means to *compare* conflicting analyses. That's better than my saying, for example, that I don't like Van Til's notion of knowledge for the reason that it's just awful or doesn't smell right. Second, my claim was that the *formal* criteriology for knowledge ascription is the same for both Linus and Charlie; they are both Presuppositionalists. I stress the word "formal" because we are comparing the two in terms of their respective epistemic *logics*, not in terms of their substantive beliefs. (To examine the *logic* of a matter is to examine its formal, structural, or purely procedural aspects. Such examination ignores substantive content to gain clarity on aspects of form.)

To return to my fanciful illustration of the problem, presuppositionalists will take a dim view of the comparison of their apologetic with tea leaf divination; but the point of analogy between presuppositionalism and reading tea leaves is hardly the suggestion, for example, that both methods of knowledge determination are simpleminded or superstitious. (Although I am glad to let those particular shoes fit whomever they will.) What I allege is that in the case of either of these methods, contradictory results may be generated while the method *itself* is powerless to produce a verdict between them. Case in point: Charlie Brown defends Christian Theology while Linus Van Pelt defends Pumpkinology. Both positions receive (at the hands of Charlie and Linus, respectively) their maximal defense—indeed, *proof!*—by means of presuppositional methodology. Given this identity of "defense," is there a