

identity of content between God and humans in terms of abstract logic, doesn't he?"

But even here, in logic no less than in theology, science, and everyday knowledge, Van Til unambiguously avers that all "human categories are but analogical of God's categories" (*A Survey of Christian Epistemology*, p.205). So our very grasp of contradiction and logical principles generally must be analogical on Van Til's reckoning. Before we finally mock up a Van Tillian criteriology for knowledge ascription, let's pay some brief attention to the overall problem that has emerged.

Van Til genuinely means to address the crux concerns of epistemology by his doctrine of analogy. Central to all those concerns is the specification of *conditions* or *criteria* by which we can *attribute* knowledge to ourselves and others. But one *necessary* condition of a human knowledge-claim or of faithful Christian apologetics is whether or not either of these possesses the property of analogicity. Analogies of the relevant sort, however, surely come in strengths: strong, moderate, weak, etc. Now if, because of our level of existence, we never have epistemic access to the divine *Exemplar* by which *alone* strengths of analogy can be measured, then Van Til has proposed an essential criterion of knowledge that can never be *known* to be satisfied.

So on Van Til's own logic, either (1) knowledge is impossible because *no* human belief can be analogically validated, or (2) "analogicity" itself, contrary to Van Til's idea that he is somehow doing epistemology, is a speculative metaphysical concept which (somehow) merely *characterizes* human knowledge by contrast to divine knowledge. I say "speculative" because the only way Van Til could *know* (and hence not speculate) that there is "no identity of content" between divine and human minds is by peeking *above* the ceiling in order to confirm that this is so—and by his own principles creatures can't do that.

Well, I think (2) is the case: Van Til's theory is a speculative metaphysics of knowledge and has precious little to do with practical epistemological matters. That is to say, Van Til gives us no help at all with specifying applicable conditions by which to certify knowledge, and it is only if knowledge can be identified in total *independence* of Van Til's metaphysical doctrine, that that doctrine can have even dubious application