

to the ultimate character of the knowledge thus (independently) identified. To repeat, Van Til provides not a clue about *how we acquire* ordinary knowledge, and *how to separate* ordinary knowledge from ignorance. Bottom line: Van Til's "theory of knowledge" is not a theory of how we may come to know things by examining data and evidence, *but is instead a metaphysics of the contrast he alleges between the mind of God and the mind of man.*

Here now is the long-awaited stab at Van Til's criteriology for ascribing knowledge. It doesn't look promising:

S knows that p truly if, but only if,
(1) p is an analogue of a divinely
 comprehended exemplar truth p',
(2) S presupposes that p,
and
(3) S's reasoning to p, or holding to p, is
 analogical of God's so reasoning
 to, or holding that p'.

Here is the way to read this analysis. One can know truly the proposition (say) that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh if, but only if: (1) there is a divinely comprehended *exemplar* proposition or content that *our* proposition "Jesus Christ has come in the flesh" is an analogy of. In the formula above I represent God's mental content with p' (pronounced p-prime). It is vital to Van Til's analysis that p and p' share *no* univocal meaning—*no same level meaning!* (2) We must presuppose that p is so. And (3) the rationality by which we discern that p must be analogical of God's comprehending that p'. Glancing up, I am tempted to say that the *reductio ad absurdum* of Van Til's view of knowledge is simply to state it with reasonable clarity.