of the Father in *this* regard? Emphatically so. The semantic feature of truth involves a basic competence to appreciate the function of language to make assertions—*the competence cognitively to appreciate language-world mappings*. While language may be used in a variety of other ways (e.g., to ask questions, congratulate, confess one's faith, make a promise, utter exclamations, give commands, pronounce verdicts, etc.), the Father's utterance *makes an assertion* about Jesus and the relationship of Jesus to himself.

The Father's assertion, moreover, has what logicians call a truth-value, and there are two such values: *true* and *false*. The adjectives "true" and "false" are used rather than the nouns "truth" and "falsehood" in order to avoid the common use of the latter to incorporate all three of the semantic features we are trying to keep separate. For example, the short expression "the truth," as in "What Jones told Smith was the truth," tends to combine reference, content meaning, and language-world mapping all into one. But the occurrence of "true" in "Jones's statement [affirming of Smith that he is bald] is true" leaves our three semantic features more nearly distinguished. That is to say, with *reference* to Smith the *content meaning* of baldness is an accurate *mapping of a fact*.

To be sure, there are different philosophical *theories* of truth (e.g., the correspondence and coherence theories), but I trust that the generality of our present concern excuses us from a discussion of the details of those theories. For what it is worth, I favor the correspondence theory and believe that the coherence theory, favored by philosophers of a more rationalistic cast of mind, is hopeless as a theory of the *meaning* of truth. (Cf. David P. Hoover, "Gordon Clark's Extraordinary View of Men & Things," *IBRI Research Report* 22 [1984], pp. 12-13.)

What is of particular importance for us here is that statements have *truth conditions*, and applying truth conditions has to do with discerning states-of-affairs in the world vis-à-vis the linguistic expression used to describe or assert them. A great deal can be said about our (created) perceptual and cognitive competence to discern the satisfaction (or non-satisfaction) of truth conditions; here I only want to indicate the *relational* character of propositional truth: the relationship between a linguistic assertion and a fact (or state-of-affairs) which that assertion seeks to state. But note carefully: I am not speaking of an *infallible* human ability to tell