means to regard a statement to be true (or false). Our human resourcefulness *to justify* or *prove* our truth-value assignments is limited in quite familiar ways; we are fallible perceivers. What Peter's comments show, rather, is that we *understand* the truth concept versus the clever-but-false-story concept whenever we *do* regard a story to be true. Van Til's theory makes hash of this distinction. That is because (1) Van Til has made all conceptual human understanding absolutely dependent on God's prior understanding, but (2) he has made the divine exemplar (i.e., God's prior understanding) for our *conceptual contrast* between the truth-values of "true" and "false" radically unavailable to the human mind.

Let's now conclude by way of three brief comments. First, the detail we have canvassed in the past few pages is vital if we are clearly to see *what* Van Til's position implies. Van Til himself supplies no such detail, thus gaining, I think, whatever specious plausibility his view has enjoyed among his followers. We see the value, therefore, of testing out his absolute "no semantic coincidence" doctrine with regard to the more finely honed concepts of reference, meaning, and truth. (This is a better way of proceeding, it seems to me, than the vague inquiry into the meaning of "absolute qualitative difference" pursued by Van Til purists like Jim Halsey.)

Second, *no* philosophical theology that inquires into the nature of human knowledge (and that is what Van Til's contribution is) can be worth its salt if it fails to reckon with the actual data of Scripture as well as with the data of human cognition. In particular, it is imperative to *test* any philosophical claim about how divine and human semantics relate to one another *against the relevant data*. Cornelius Van Til, however, deals not at all with the data of human cognition and very little with Scripture. In fact, he almost *never* engaged in biblical exegesis! Over his career that failure, I think, had the long term effect of severely blunting his sense of the need to fit theory to data. The result, if my analysis of the implications of Van Til's analogy doctrine is anywhere near correct, is that he has defended the Incomprehensibility of God at the price of making *unintelligible* the very idea of divine-to-human and human-to-divine communication.

And third, there seems to be an ultimate irony in Van Til's analogy doctrine, for that very doctrine places a rather catastrophic limitation on what an "omnipotent" God can bring about with regard to communication