

Christian theism can be seen for the following reasons: (1) the God who created our finite epistemic endowment with its distinctive capacities and powers does not overstep those capacities and powers in disclosing himself to us. He would not, for example, speak to us in "the tongues of angels" with no possibility of translation. Nor would he require that we deduce or infer Christian theism from such discrete and isolated data as "the grass in my yard is green" or "Andrew Jackson was once President of the United States". Even if, from the standpoint of omniscience, such discrete data have implicatory connections for the entire "plan of God," they do not wear those connections on their sleeves for the likes of us! (2) The evidential relation is necessarily a piecemeal affair for *finite* intellects—an affair involving the competence to classify similarities, to sample individuals and events that show promise of being *representative* of larger wholes, and the amazing competence—strikingly exhibited by modern physics—to *mathematically* represent physical regularities in the world about us. Those regularities ( $E = mc^2$ , for example) are *discovered* regularities in nature, not aprioristically derived from rationalistic first principles. Empirically speaking, they are determined piecemeal, and their character depends upon how the world is *discovered* to be. But (3), and most importantly, the evidential relation itself is profoundly wrapped up in our inhabiting *a causal order*. It is the causal order that sets up our expectations and is the foundation for partial knowledge. Moreover, that is why it is epistemically stunning whenever divine power interrupts that order by miracle.

The causal relation, like the relation of logical implication, is *primitive*. To say that a relation is primitive is to say that it is not reducible to any other relation. But if the causal relation is indeed primitive, it cannot be *reduced to* the implicatory relation of logic. A key philosophical mistake the Van Tillians make, I am convinced, is their tendency to write and speak in a way that *conflates* the causal relation with the implicatory relation. (In the history of philosophy, rationalists of all metaphysical persuasions have been prone to do this. That is because, roughly, certainty is secured for them by logical deducibility from self-evident first principles rather than by the contingent causal regularity of the world.) So while using the same causal language as their evidentialist brethren, presuppositionalists have tended to grant only the implicatory relation a decisive role in their theorizing. That is fatal for reasoning about the relationship of God to the creation and about the relationship of the creation to God. The reason is that *the implicatory relation governs coherent*