

"Patience, dear Schroeder," continued Linus. "You're not dealing with the issue of ontology raised by Van Til. Keep in mind that radically distinct ontologies entail radically distinct epistemic modalities. Hang on to that. Now, would you say that it is the person that can be said to know, or is it the person's nature?"

"I think I see where this is going," said Schroeder. "It's the person, of course; it's the agent."

Linus pressed on: "And how many persons is Jesus?"

"One person."

"And that *one* person is fully God?"

"Anything less would be heresy," replied Schroeder. "But he's fully man as well."

"Perfect," said Linus. "As a cognitive agent Jesus is a *single* 'integrated' perceiver, believer, and knower, and this must be held as being logically consistent with Jesus being both divine and human. The problem is that these elements *cannot* logically coexist on Van Til's ontological doctrine—his 'theology of knowledge' so to speak. That's because, as we've already seen, there is an infinite, or shall we say ontologically unbridgeable, gap between divinely structured knowing and humanly structured knowing. In a nutshell, if persons individuate knowers, Jesus, on Van Til's ontological doctrine, would have to be *two* persons, not one. That's the ancient Nestorian heresy, isn't it Charles?"

"And to come full circle, Schroeder, you weren't seeing the difficulty when you said, 'He, Jesus, could know both analogically, because he's a man, and univocally, because he's God.' Do you see the contradiction in that statement? When you say 'he' you can refer to only *one* knower. Van Til's ontological principle absolutely forbids mixing, melding, or somehow homogenizing divine and human knowing. Or, if you like, it is fundamentally incoherent to say of an ontically unified knower that he knows an item of knowledge both analogically and univocally at one and the same time. So if the 'he' refers to a single and fully integrated epistemic