

"Yeah, where?" echoed Marcy.

To this Linus said, "He is there for you if you believe."

"Otherwise not?" joined in Schroeder.

Linus scratched his head. "Well, if you don't believe, he's still *there*, but not for you."

Lucy said, "Why should we believe you?"

"Because it's true," said Linus patiently.

"Okay, Linus," said Harold; "how can we know that The Great Pumpkin isn't just a *product of your belief*? What, exactly, is the difference between the Pumpkin being out there and his *not* being out there. Does the *difference* this makes *make a difference*? You say yourself that observation can neither verify nor falsify his presence over the pumpkin patch."

"Right on!" exclaimed Lucy, nearly spilling her coffee. "Since evidence of *any* kind is irrelevant, we might as well say the Great Potato or the Great Rhubarb or the Great Turnip is out there!"

"Very cute," sulked Linus. "Your problem, Lucy, is that you lack the intuitive sophistication to deal with a *geschichtlich* phenomenon—*analogically* apprehended, of course. Presupposing The Great Pumpkin is cognitively primitive; it is the *ground* of intelligibility itself; hence it cannot be a candidate for proof or disproof. Tell them, Charlie."

"My head hurts," said Brown.

"Let me have a try at it, Linus," said Schroeder. "I think what Harold's point amounts to is that if you put all testing and evidence off-limits, you trivialize the claims you are making. If nothing could count against the Pumpkin, then there's no possible experience that your position rules out. It's all the same whether or not the Pumpkin shows. But . . . any