

"I'm not yet sure how to put it," began Linus. "Maybe it's *better felt than telt*, as the saying goes. What I think I mean is there seems to be something in human beings that prefers elaborate intellectual detours to commonsense and the face value of experience. After listening to Harold and Schroeder it has suddenly dawned on me that Christian apologetes as well as the secular philosophical giants of our time have a very hard time with epistemological finitude. Forgive me if I seem to ramble, but I'm trying verbally to focus what I'm only beginning to see.

"The wall I have been knocking my head against—as surely as the orthodox presuppositionalists—is a wall of *finitude*. Harold called it an epistemological ceiling. Encased as we are within epistemological finitude, it's impossible to provide certain kinds of guarantee for even the most mundane of truths, let alone transcendent truth. Please don't get me wrong; I think we are well supplied with both levels of truth. But finitude, coupled with whatever scientific advance there may be to work with, typically sends humans into historically powerful philosophical detours. These detours—the *Kantian detour*, for example—are easy to interpret as the attempt to have "perfect" knowledge within a carefully delineated domain. While supposedly setting forth the structure of any possible *scientific* knowledge, it put knowledge of the supernatural off limits *in principle* for our kind of mind. It's too long a story to tell right now, but I think Van Til allowed Kant to formulate the 'knowledge problem' that Christian apologetics must somehow overcome concerning the knowledge of God. As I'm coming to see it now, however, Kant simply did not formulate a problem that ought to have been accepted by Christians."

"Could you back up," said Harold; "I'm curious about how you construe the finiteness of human knowing. What's the quarrel supposed to be?"

Taking a moment to respond, Linus continued: "It is so often thought that apologetics—whether in behalf of God or as in my case, in behalf of the Great Pumpkin—is about *proof* rather than *defense*. If it's proof we demand, our intuitions seem to require a technical logical *guarantee*. But once that is even your tacit ambition, you're sunk; and you're sunk whether you're a college freshman or an Albert Einstein. *Finite* perceivers, believers, and knowers have no way to transcend their quite limited epistemic powers in order to guarantee the beliefs that these powers