

ineffable: inexpressible in words.

interpretation: this is at once the most fascinating and most frustrating of concepts in apologetics. Humans do not robotically read off the facts of their world as though facts were mechanically registered on the brain. Instead, humans "interpret" their world. To use Linus's terminology, *internalists* stress what the mind brings to experience. The thoroughgoing internalist (Kant, e.g.) insists that the subjective mind supplies *all* the structure to an essentially unstructured raw experience. Internalist considerations these days have to do with determining the paradigms, values, theories, and presuppositions which are said to subjectively structure what is "out there."

Externalists stress the mind/brain's causal fittingness to whatever is "out there." For the latter, it is the overall *causal structure* of mind/environment interaction that keeps interpretation and objective reality in phase. Contemporary cognitive science, as one might expect, is far more externalist than internalist, for otherwise there could not be a *science* of cognition. Van Til, it would certainly appear, is a thoroughgoing internalist. The position favored in *The Defeasible Pumpkin* is the desire for balance on this issue, but leans toward externalism. At any rate, confidence about objectivity *is* possible simply because we share *common* epistemic endowments, a *common* language, and a *common* world.

justification theoretic access: this is just a fancy way of saying "epistemic access which operates upon worked out, or specified, criteria."

Kantianism: this is not so easily defined in such a short space. Immanuel Kant [1724-1804] developed a grand system that attempted to explain how it is possible to have knowledge over against the skepticism of David Hume [1711-1776]. Kant was extremely impressed by the science of his day—that of Sir Isaac Newton, so his project was to exhibit what the human mind *must* bring to experience in order to think Newtonianly. His famous and still enormously influential *Critique of Pure Reason* is in essence an inventory of the requisite mental equipment—the formal and intuitive contribution of the mind that gives scientific knowledge its character. Kant insisted that the only way to avoid Hume's skepticism, is to exhibit by rational (transcendental) deduction that the *mind*, and *not* external reality, supplies space, time, and even the causal category itself!