

The mind *constructs* its knowledge, according to Kant, and the constructed (Newtonian and Euclidean) reality thus constructed is phenomenal only; it is *never* of things in themselves, things that exist independently of the mind.

Van Til's presuppositions bear more than a superficial resemblance to Kantian categories of mind, because presuppositions (1) are mentally supplied, and (2) are conditions of intelligibility rather than rationally arrived at by means of evidential learning. Van Til too is a constructivist of sorts. By Kantianism, then, one should think generally of mental constructivism.

lawlike regularity: although philosophers often make a distinction between "lawlike" and "causal" regularity, Hoover has treated the two concepts interchangeably. While causal regularity is a metaphysical category applied to *forces* in nature (associated with causal *mechanisms*), lawlike regularity is sheer temporal invariance that can profitably be represented mathematically. Lawlike regularity, strictly speaking, dispenses with metaphysical causation and primitive mechanism, making use of the concept of *regularity* alone [e.g., Newton's universal law of gravitation; Newton's law makes no use of "cause" in the philosophical sense].

levels of existence: philosophically, this is an *ontological* issue. It is an issue, that is, that involves the *sort of being* enjoyed by individuals in this or that domain (e.g., the mental and the physical). For Van Til's purposes, what matters is the sheer radical *difference* between the level of existence of the Creator and the level of existence of the creature. His view is that if two beings differ utterly in level of existence (if they have radically differing ontologies), then they have radically different ways of structuring knowledge.

A crucial problem with this idea is whether we really know what we are talking about when we speak, in the required *utterly abstract terms*, of radical differences of essences, beings, or existence levels. It seems that we could "prove" the impossibility of the Incarnation of Christ, for example, if such abstractions were to be given free reign. Or, to take an example from everyday experience, we might "prove" on ontological grounds that consciousness *cannot* be facilitated by physical brain processes since