

consciousness seems radically different *in kind of being* from anything physical.

**logic:** the science of correct reasoning—the study of inference, implication, and the *patterns of thought* that either *conserve* truth (strict deduction), or reliably *extend* our knowledge *given that* statements expressing the evidence are established (induction). Deductive logic is absolutely conservative, while good inductive logic facilitates the *extension* of knowledge, going from what *is* known to what was *formerly* unknown. Since there is an element of epistemic "risk" involved in all induction, and since strict rationalists (e.g., Gordon H. Clark) are utterly paranoid about such risk, the rationalistic temperament in apologetics either forswears all induction or incorporates it only after saying exceedingly strange things about it.

Think, for example, of induction and ordinary vision. On the strict rationalist approach it is as if we must leave off incorporating visual data because the human optical system sometimes suffers visual misconstrual: illusion, hallucination, or lack of visual acuity due to sickness or poor viewing conditions! Or because human eyes are, *in their visual finitude*, somehow epistemically unworthy. God *could* have wired our brains with sonar, Doppler radar, field detectors, and all sorts of other fancy receptors. Why didn't he? Maybe it just takes humility to be grateful for the apparatus we *are* endowed with. It's such a pity that *epistemological perfectionism* has taken such a toll on Christian "rationalists".

Notice, however, that humans are not second-order seers! If one *sees* the charging grizzly bear in one's path, one does not *simultaneously* see (in the conscious optical sense) one's seeing of this awful sight in order to correct it for errors or to free such perception from pagan "univocation." (Cf. Linus's discussion of "knowing that one knows".) One only *sees* it. Such is our "woefully impoverished" state of seeing and of sensing in general. (I speak sarcastically here.) Rationalists, though, are a notoriously unhappy bunch when it comes to our *created* sensory endowment. But Hoover has convinced me that merely seeing isn't so bad; praise God for simple visual *competence*, I say! Isn't it grand that a meta-order presupposition is *not* required to cognitively make out the bear I see by ordinary "first-order" vision? For then, *mauled* and *eaten* is what I'd be! (Van Til declares that cognizing such a *fact* about the bear [or any other