

partial knowledge: can you know your colors if you have no knowledge of the nature of light? Can you recognize a maple tree even if you know very little botany? Can you know the lay of the land on your property if you can't locate Afghanistan on a world globe? A "yes" answer to these questions is at least a naive commitment to being able to know partially without knowing exhaustively. The more technical way to go at this issue is to consider the possibility that the universe might be a system that importantly qualifies each of its parts so that true understanding of any part is somehow to see that the entire system implies it. *In principle*, that is roughly Van Til's position. The vital point to notice is that Van Til's holism essentially trades the causal relation for the implicatory relation.

The "problem" of partial knowledge is perhaps the most convenient issue clearly to see the enormous philosophical difference between Van Til and the evidentialists. The position taken in *Defeasible Pumpkin* is that causal regularity in the creation, and *not* holistic rational entailment, is the ground of evidential salience, and hence also of partial knowledge.

personal estrangement: a spiritual affective-cognitive condition in which the capacity for empathy and mutual understanding with another is blocked. If not interrupted, personal estrangement is a condition whose *dynamic* is progressive cognitive distortion of the other.

personal proof: the having of personal proof is the cognitive state in which one has reached a *moral* (as opposed to a formal logical) certainty; personal proof results in *existential undeniability* regardless of abstract or technical probability.

point of contact: the area of common ground—or at least *cognitive* common ground—from which genuine communication may proceed. Common *cognitive* ground is often possible even when *spiritual* common ground is lacking.

predication: an assertion *of* or *about* something. The importance of this term is the very central role it plays in Van Til's thought. A key claim for Van Til is that only the God of Christian theism can account for intelligible predication. Here are three problems this poses: (1) Given that *intelligible* predication encompasses both true and false predication, Van Til has spread his net impossibly wide. Without laboring the point, actually *to*