

*argue* such an argumentative objective (or conclusion) would require omniscience. (2) Van Til states in *Defense of the Faith* (p.121) that "man's system of knowledge [set of true predications] must ... be an analogical replica of the system of knowledge which belongs to God." But given his "no identity-no coincidence" doctrine, any human system of predication—i.e., any would-be "analogical replica" of God's system of predication—is systematically cut off from the system it is supposed to replicate. And (3), the very notion of predication itself within Van Til's vocabulary is often conflated with factuality itself.

This (latter issue) is a serious matter, since Van Til repeatedly speaks of facts as the very spatio-temporal particulars that make up the world and its history [e.g., God is said to *create* and to *control* facts]. But given that facts themselves are *of* or *about* things [i.e., it is *about* things—spatio-temporal objects, agencies, structures, as well as nonmaterial subjects of predication—that there are facts], it is inviting confusion to make the fundamental problem of apologetics the accounting for all intelligible predication. The structures of predication constitute the *medium* by which we investigate the world, the *medium* by which our resulting understanding is represented. In a subtle way (and often not so subtle) Van Tillian trains of thought spring from a running together of predication and what predication is about.

What must be kept in mind, is that predication is *logically governed* and *linguistically structured*, while spatio-temporal reality is sustained by causal cohesion and governed by lawlike regularity. Van Til, like rationalists in general, tends to assimilate the causal relation to the relation of logical implication. It's easy to do that when the reality domain you're attempting to account for is *treated as* a domain of sheer predication.

**presuppositionalism:** apologetic approach that (1) proceeds on the assumption of zero cognitive and spiritual common ground, (2) assumes the truth of the *entirety* of the position to be exhibited, (3) uses a *reductio ad absurdum* strategy on opposing views, and (4) holds that to concede probability (of less than 1.0) is to concede that God's revelation lacks both authority and clarity.

**probability argumentation:** *Informal:* any argumentation whose force is conceded as less than 100% conclusive—that, given the evidence, the