

prophecy and miracle.

Here is a brief word about the *kind* of project *The Defeasible Pumpkin* is. The reader will quickly discover that it is not the sort of work, for example, that was put together by Josh McDowell in *Evidence that Demands a Verdict*. There is an extensive Christian literature, of which McDowell's work is a splendid example, that advances *specific* arguments *in the field*, so to speak, which show, in as much detail as you please, why the claims of biblical Christianity are true and why various arguments against it do not succeed. Without apology, I place myself squarely within *that* tradition of apologetics. If a label is wanted, I am an *evidentialist* in apologetics. (During my years at seminary I came to evidentialism reluctantly, from a rather wholehearted commitment to Van Til's *presuppositionalism*. In those days, if there had been a card to carry as a presuppositionalist, I would have carried it!)

In essence the 20th century dispute between the evidential and presuppositional apologete is not about labels or code words. It is about how best to construe the *intellectual foundation* required for the believer "to set forth his case," "to give a reason for the hope that is within him." Discussing the intellectual foundation for arguing the truth of Christianity is a different sort of enterprise, for the most part, than providing specific evidences for specific Christian truth claims. It is different, for example, than arguing that Moses *did* write the Pentateuch, or that Jesus's disciple Peter *did* write II Peter, or that Noah's Ark is currently embedded in a glacier near the 13,000 foot level of Mt. Ararat in Turkey (a claim about which I remain unpersuaded but open), or that biblical history *is* accurate as history, or that Jesus did *in fact* rise from death, or that the narrative involving the Star of Bethlehem does *not* imply a biblical endorsement of astrology.

In contrast to these individual issues, *foundational* issues tend to be philosophical in character, which means they are more nearly *conceptual* than *factual*. I say "more nearly" because factual issues always make themselves felt in philosophical disputes. It is of crucial importance, nevertheless, to recognize that the dispute between evidentialism and presuppositionalism is primarily a conceptual dispute at the foundational level. And the conceptual differences involved have rather drastically affected how particular presuppositionalists and evidentialists perceive the